A central feature of autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is an impairment in 'social attention'-the prioritized processing of socially relevant information, e.g. the eyes and face. Socially relevant stimuli are also preferentially attended in a broader categorical sense, however: observers orient preferentially to people and animals (compared to inanimate objects) in complex natural scenes. To measure the scope of social attention deficits in autism, observers viewed alternating versions of a natural scene on each trial, and had to 'spot the difference' between them-where the difference involved either an animate or inanimate object. Change detection performance was measured as an index of attentional prioritization. Individuals with ASD showed the same prioritized social attention for animate categories as did control participants. This could not be explained by lower level visual factors, since the effects disappeared when using blurred or inverted images. These results suggest that social attention -and its impairment in autism -may not be a unitary phenomenon: impairments in visual processing of specific social cues may occur despite intact categorical prioritization of social agents.
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Introduction: social attention
Humans are exceptionally social primates, and increasing evidence suggests that human social cognition is not simply the application of general cognitive abilities to social perception and behavior, but may reflect the operation of distinct specialized processes (e.g. Adolphs, 2006; Saxe, Moran, Scholz, & Gabrieli, 2006) . Evidence of dedicated mechanisms for social perception and attention has come from a wide array of sources. Neuroscientific research has identified several brain areas that seem specialized for social information processing, such as the superior temporal sulcus (e.g. Allison, Puce, & McCarthy, 2000) and the medial prefrontal cortices (Schultz et al., 2003 1995). Experimental psychology has revealed social phenomena such as reflexive gaze following (e.g. Frischen, Bayliss, & Tipper, 2007) . And developmental psychologists have demonstrated that processes related to social evaluation operate even in infants as young as 6 months (e.g. Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 2007) . The scope of social information that has been implicated in such studies is also enormous, varying from simple cues to animacy in moving geometric shapes (e.g. Gao, Newman, & Scholl, 2009; Heider & Simmel, 1944) to the most nuanced inference of emotions as expressed in the eyes (e.g. Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, & Joliffe, 1997) . However, these many types of social information have often been at least implicitly regarded as products of an integrated social perception system-the 'social brain ' (e.g. Brothers, 1990) . Indeed, such results (and the importance of social information more generally) have even lead some to suggest that primates' large brains are due in considerable part to their need to navigate a complex social world (e.g. Byrne & Whiten, 1988; Hermann, Call, Hernández-Lloreda, Hare, & Tomasello, 2007; Humphrey, 1976) . Nevertheless, it is possible to evaluate the extent to which social perception is a single and fully integrated network of faculties. It may be, instead, that social perception results from a group of distinct processes that are only conceptually grouped together-and that may stand or fall separately in developmental disorders. In par-
